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According to a joint report of the World Health Organization and the Pan American
Health Organization in September 2002 there were approximately 1.4 million HIV+ people in
Latin America, and a further 420,000 HIV+ people in the Caribbean. The number of infections
had increased by nearly 10% from the previous year in Latin America, and 16% in the
Caribbean.1 While striking, these figures may obscure the diversity of the HIV epidemic in the
region. Latin America has a varied pattern of infections, which means that the experience of
Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico is quite different from that of Honduras, Haiti and the Dominican
Republic.2 Still, during the 1990s much of Latin America witnessed a trend that saw the ratio of
men to women with the disease decline, while HIV made increasing inroads amongst the poorest
segments of the population. While men having sex with men remained a group at risk,
unprotected heterosexual sex became increasingly important in the transmission of HIV, and
commentators began to refer to the “feminization” of the epidemic.3 AIDS has devastated the gay
community, but it has also spread widely amongst women and young adults, and from major
urban centers to the most remote and culturally isolated regions.4
Given this fact, one would expect to find a wide and rich range of scholarship in English
on AIDS in Latin America. Yet scholarly attention to this topic came late in North America and
there is surprisingly little comparative writing in the field.5 Only Cuba and Brazil have received
considerable attention from North American scholars because of their HIV/AIDS policies. These
countries adopted opposing approaches to dealing with the epidemic, but their policies did share
two characteristics: they both successfully contained HIV, and they both generated international
controversy. This paper will examine how an international context shaped the development of
both countries’ policies on HIV/AIDS.
International Context
This emphasis on international relationships is somewhat unusual. Public health scholars
have a standard series of questions to understand the spread of HIV in different countries: what is
the epidemiology of the disease in each nation, the underlying health infrastructure, the
approaches taken to prevention, the obstacles to success, and the underlying factors that have
affected the response to the disease. But the contradiction of AIDS is that this biological disorder
1

Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization, “Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
in the Americas, 54th Session, 23-27 September, 2002,” Washington, D.C., PAHO/WHO, 2002, 3.
2
C.W. Henderson, “Diversity of AIDS Epidemic is a Risk Factor in the Americas,” AIDS Weekly (July 9,
2001), 6.
3
According to a recent study by the Pan American Health Organization, less than a third of the total
cumulative AIDS cases in the southern cone (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay) have been among
men having sex with men. In Central America, 78.8% of all people with AIDS became HIV+ through
heterosexual sex. The figures for the Caribbean are similar (76.1% for the Latin Caribbean, 79.5% for the
English, Dutch and French Caribbean). Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization,
AIDS Surveillance in the Americas: Biannual Report, December 2001. (Washington, D.C: PAHO/WHO,
2001), 6, 8, 9, 10. A similar pattern holds true in Brazil as the work of Brazilian epidemiologists such as
Celia Landmann Szwarcwald has demonstrated. Indeed, men who have sex with men have not made up the
majority of notified infections in any region of Brazil since the mid-1990s, and in some regions less than a
fifth of new infections are among this group. Celia Landmann Szwarcwald, Francisco Inácio Bastos,
Maria Angela Pires Estves, Carla L. Tavares de Andrade, “A disseminação da epidemia da AIDS no Brasil,
no período de 1987-1996: uma análise especial,” Cadernos de Saúde Pública, 16:1 (2000), 14.
4
Sandra W. Key and Daniel J. DeNoon, “AIDS May Become Biggest Killer of Latin America’s Youth,”
AIDS Weekly Plus (11/24/97), 12-13.
5
Most Latin Americanists rely on the Handbook of Latin American Studies as a reference. This annual
publication provides an annotated bibliography of important works on Latin America published during
preceding years. In an average year, it will provide reviews of 8,000-10,000 books and articles in English,
Spanish, Portuguese, and French. Yet during the late 1980s and early 1990s for many years there was no
listing for HIV/AIDS in each volume’s very comprehensive subject index. Of course, important work was
being done on this topic in Latin America, but it did not attract much attention outside of the region.
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spread by personal behaviors is shaped by a wide variety of societal and cultural issues. One
cannot understand the spread of HIV/AIDS without considering international forces, as Paul
Farmer’s work has stressed for the Caribbean:
The Caribbean nations with high attack rates of AIDS are all part of the West
Atlantic system. A relation between the degree of “insertion” in this network and
prevalence of AIDS is suggested by the following exercise. Excluding Puerto
Rico, which is not an independent country, the five Caribbean basin nations with
the largest number of cases by 1986 were as follows: the Dominican Republic,
the Bahamas, Trinidad/Tobago, Mexico, and Haiti. In terms of trade, which are
the five countries most dependent on the United States? Export indices offer a
convenient marker of involvement in the West Atlantic system. In both 1983 and
1977, the years for which such data are available, the same five countries were
most linked to the United States economically- and they are precisely those
countries with the largest number of AIDS cases.6
This argument can be taken too far, and early in the epidemic exaggerated perceptions about the
“foreignness” of AIDS in many countries impeded an effective response to the epidemic. At the
same time, however, international forces have shaped the epidemic throughout the region and
may help to explain the fractured nature of the Latin American epidemic.
One cannot understand the Cuban government’s response to the epidemic without
addressing that country’s relationship to the United States. Brazil’s program to provide free
medications to all AIDS patients was funded by the World Bank, but Brazilian AIDS policies led
to an international controversy that drew in the U.S. government, multinational drug companies,
NGO’s and the World Health Organization. Latin American institutions, sexual practices,
cultural barriers, religious beliefs, and social mores have all influenced the spread of HIV/AIDS,
but they have done so within a particular international context.
The Early Perception of AIDS in Latin America
Throughout Latin America, HIV/AIDS initially was viewed as a U.S. and gay disease in
the early 1980s. While it served as a symbol for both the strengths and failings of U.S. society,
AIDS was not seen as a disorder likely to spread in Latin America, as the comments of the
Mexican medical establishment made clear. In 1985 one doctor, Ruiz Palacios, said that it didn’t
make sense to “expend great economic and human resources to investigate and fight this malady,
as in the United States, when there are other disorders.”7 Dr. Cipriano Borges Cordero, the
academic chief of gastric medicine at UNAM spoke of the divine punishment of the city of
Sodom in the bible and said that this was perhaps the antecedent for what was happening in “New
York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Miami and Newark, where 70 percent of the AIDS cases in
the United States have been reported.”8 AIDS was not a disease that would spread out from the
United States, as the comments of Dr. Manuel Cervantes Reyes the president of the Mexican
Association of Doctors (AMM) made clear: “Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome will cause
less damage in Mexico than in developed countries like the United States, given that our
population has greater natural defenses from being in contact from an early age with a wide range
6

Paul Farmer, AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992).
7
Excélsior, August 30, 1985, quoted in Max Mejía, “Economia Politica y control epidemiologico del sida
en mexico,” in El SIDA en Mexico: Los Efectos Sociales, ed. Francisco Galván Díaz (Mexico City:
Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1988), 31. See also Paula Anderson, “AIDS in Mexico as an opportunity for
Compassion and Growth through Dialogue,” (M.A. thesis: Portland State University, 2003), 4-5.
8
Revista Siempre, No. 1674, August 24, 1985 and El Sol de México, 1st ed. August 1985, quoted in Mejía,
31.
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of germs. . .”9 While Cordera Campos made a video about AIDS in Mexico in 1989, AIDS still
appeared to be a predominantly American, as opposed to Latin American, disease.10
The early imagery associated with AIDS revealed a great deal about how American
nations viewed their neighbors. As Paul Farmer’s work on Haiti has made clear, in the United
States AIDS became associated with images of voodoo and savagery. The Center for Disease
Control identified Haitians as a separate risk group on weak epidemiological grounds. At the
same time, some Haitians believed that the United States might have deliberately created the
epidemic as a means to stop the immigration of Haitians.11 In Brazil, the association of AIDS
with the United States meant that it was seen as a disease of the rich, and the media asked if
Brazil was “sophisticated” enough to be vulnerable. From this perspective, its arrival was taken
as a sign that Brazil was “civilized.”12 This perception changed rapidly after 1986 as it became
clear that there was a significant heterosexual epidemic in Africa. AIDS then quickly came to be
associated with poverty and blackness, so that the depiction of the disease was influenced by
ideas about race. But the original perception of AIDS may help to explain the initially slow
response of Brazilian authorities to the disease.
In Cuba as well ideas about AIDS were shaped largely by the perception that this was an
American (U.S.) disease. Cuba had an exoticized image of the disease that may have legitimated
sweeping public health measures. Fidel Castro himself blamed the United States for the existence
of the AIDS:
Fidel Castro himself followed this tradition in a September 1988 speech: “Who
brought AIDS to Latin America? Who was the great AIDS vector in the Third
World? Why are there countries like the Dominican Republic, with 40,000
carriers of the virus, and Haiti, and other countries of South and Central
America- high rates in Mexico and Brazil and other countries? Who brought it?
The United States, that’s a fact.” The foreign power that had militarily invaded
Cuba in the past, that had made numerous assassination attempts on his life, that
maintained hostile policies, could now be blamed for introducing the plague.13
While it is true that the early history of the epidemic likely was shaped by population flows to and
from the United States, this rhetoric of blame ignored the complexity of the epidemic. It also
provided a framework for the Cuban response to this health issue.
The Cuban Response to the Epidemic
Unlike some other Latin American nations, Cuba began an aggressive program to control
HIV from the earliest stage of the epidemic. This program has had remarkable successes.
According to UNAIDS by 2001 there had been 3200 reported cases of HIV/AIDS in Cuba, a
country with over eleven million people. This equated with a seropositive rate of less than 0.1%,
a figure lower than that for the state of Minnesota.14 This low rate is surprising for a country in
9

El dictámen de Veracruz, August 25, 1985, Excélsior, August 24, 1985, quoted in Mejía, 32.
Cordero Campos, El SIDA en México, Video Recording (Mexico City: Nexos TV, 1989). Videotape
obtained from Biblioteca Daniel Casio Villeca, Mexico.
11
See Farmer, AIDS and Accusation, 208-243.
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Cristiana Bastos, Global Responses to AIDS: Science in Emergency (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1999), 70-71. See also Claudia Moraes and Sérgio Carrara, “AIDS: Um vírus só não faz
a doença,” Comunicações do ISER, vol. 17, 5-19.
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Leiner, 131. It would be wrong to describe Fidel Castro’s attitude as being unusual. Early in the
epidemic a wide range of nations blamed the epidemic upon U.S. decadence. Ibid, 136-137.
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UNAIDS, “Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections, 2002 update,
Cuba,” accessed on-line on Feb. 5, 2003, http://www.unaids.org/hivaidsinfo/statistics/factsheets/pdfs/Cuba-en.pdf. For the fact that Minnesota has a higher rate of HIV infection see Tasya
Rosenfield and Kira Herbrand’s report, “Part One: the AIDS colony” at www.kfai.org/programs/
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which the epidemic was dominated by heterosexual transmission from the start.15 Fifty-six of the
early cases were among soldiers returning from service in Africa.16 To some extent Cuba may
have been shielded from early infection by its isolation from the U.S., because of that country’s
economic blockade of the island. But Cuba also had significant exchange programs with other
countries, and welcomed large numbers of students from African nations where the virus was
present early in the pandemic: “Of primary concern were the more than 380,000 Cubans who had
traveled abroad, as soldiers in Africa, or as advisers, diplomats, or participants in cultural
exchange programs.”17 Thus it is likely that the low rate of HIV in that country is more a result of
the government’s efforts to control the epidemic than its separation from the world community,
and in particular the United States.
Early in the epidemic Cuba began an extensive program to control the spread of HIV. It
banned the importation of blood from Europe, and destroyed 22,000 containers of foreign
blood.18 Not all government measures may have helped to fight the virus. For example, as
Marvin Leiner has stressed the Cuban government did not initially place great emphasis on mass
education as a way to prevent the disease, which is surprising in a country with excellent literacy
rates and a good health infrastructure.19 Instead, the Cuban government began the mass testing of
the population for HIV beginning in 1986. Those who tested HIV positive were isolated in
sanatoria, and their sexual contacts were traced. By 1989 the government tested over seventyfive percent of the population over the age of fifteen for HIV.20 This figure continued to increase:
“By April 1991, 9,771,691 people, almost the entire population had been tested.”21 Every Cuban
province had its own sanitarium.
locnews/aids.htm Accessed on February 14, 2003. It is true that there are some questions about the
reliability of Cuban government statistics. For a debate on this issue, see the correspondence concerning
“Controlling AIDS in Cuba,” and Bayer and Healton’s response, New England Journal of Medicine, 321:12
(Sept. 21, 1989): 829-830. Some Cuban assertions do seem dubious. For example, according to the Cuban
Ministry of Public Health “illicit drug use does not exist in Cuba and thus is not a risk factor for HIV
infection.” Pérez-Stable, 563. But when Vladimir Ceballos released a documentary on AIDS in Cuba in
1994 entitled Maldito se tu nombre libertad, it included interviews with HIV+ Cubans who were injecting
drug users. For the government’s denial that IDU use is spreading the disease see Tasya Rosenfield and
Kira Herbrand’s report, “Part Three: the Cure” at www.kfai.org/programs/locnews/ aids.htm Accessed on
February 14, 2003. Still, in general Cuban figures do seem reliable. Pérez-Stable, “Cuba’s Response,”
564.
15
For the fact that the epidemic was initially mainly spread through heterosexual sex see Sarah Santana,
Lily Faas, and Karen Wald, “Chapter *: Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Duba: the Public Health
Response of a Third World Country,” in Aids: the Politics of Survival. Ed. Nancy Krieger (Amityville, NY:
Baywood Publishing Inc., 1994), 174.
16
Rosenfield and Herbrand, “AIDS colony.” For the fact that many of the early cases of HIV were among
returning soldiers and their partners see Marvin Leiner, Sexual Politics in Cuba: Machismo,
Homosexuality, and AIDS (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 122 and Ian Lumsden, Machos, Maricones,
and Gays: Cuba and Homosexuality (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 161; R. Bazell,
“Happy Campers,” New Republic, 206:10 (1992), 14.
17
Cheryl Healton and Ronald Bayrer, “Special Report: Controlling AIDS in Cuba: the Logic of
Quarantine,” The New England Journal of Medicine 320:15 (April 1989): 1022.
18
Tasya Rosenfield and Kira Herbrand’s report, “Part three: the cure” at www.kfai.org/programs/
locnews/aids.htm Accessed on February 14, 2003.
19
Marvin Leiner, Sexual Politics in Cuba: Machismo, Homosexuality and AIDS. (San Francisco: Westview
Press, 1994), 133-134. See also Cheryl Healton and Ronald Bayrer, “Special Report: Controlling AIDS in
Cuba: the Logic of Quarantine,” The New England Journal of Medicine 320:15 (April 1989): 1022. Helena
Hansen and N.E. Groce, “From Quarantine to Condoms,” 261.
20
Eliseo J. Pérez-Stable, “Cuba’s Response to the Epidemic,” American Journal of Public Health, 81:5
(1991): 563. Cheryl Healton and Ronald Bayer provided a lower figure of three million Cubans having
been tested by 1989 in their work. Healton and Bayrer, “Controlling AIDS in Cuba,” 1023
21
See also Leiner, 117.
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The sanatoria attracted international attention, because of human rights concerns. One
the one hand patients in the sanitaria received free medical care, access to medications, additional
rations, their salaries and better living conditions than were available to Cubans living outside.
On the other hand, this policy stigmatized HIV positive Cubans. In practice many HIV+ Cubans
found it to be impossible to say “no” when asked to go to the sanitaria, at least during the early
years of the program.22 And while these facilities with their small cabanas and manicured lawns
appeared attractive, they initially had guards, gates, and in some cases fences topped by barbed
wire.23 Moreover, families were separated by this policy. One woman commented that the most
difficult part of being in a sanitarium had been being removed from her nine year old son.24 Cuba
was nearly unique internationally in adopting this policy, which reflected a number of distinct
aspects of Cuban society, and Cuba’s perception of itself.
Cuba had an international reputation in the field of public health, from which the nation
had drawn considerable legitimacy internationally since the revolution. Cuba had invested both
energy and capital in its public health infrastructure, and it was probably the only country in Latin
America that had the public health institutions to carry out this program of mass testing. Cuba’s
policy was also possible because of the character of its government. There were no independent
NGOs or gay rights organizations with the power to oppose government policy, nor was there an
independent news media. The long-standing hostility with the United States also had undermined
the legitimacy of institutions that the government did not control: “Organizations such as gay
rights groups are seen in terms of their potential for facilitating CIA infiltration.”25 There was a
long government tradition of intolerance towards homosexuality, as demonstrated by the forced
induction of gays into the Military Units to Aid Production (UMAP) from 1965-1967 and Cuban
legislation of the 1970s.26 All these factors, but in particular the equation of political organization
with pro-U.S. sympathies served to bolster the Cuban government’s quarantine policy.
This does not deny, however, that the policy had considerable public support, and even
many homosexuals backed mandatory testing and confinement.27 Cuba has traditionally placed
more emphasis on social than individual rights. The Cuban government argued that its policy was
more humane than that of the United States, where the government did not guarantee the health
care, medications, jobs, or housing of people with AIDS. From this point of view, it was better to
be living in a Cuban sanatorium than to be homeless on the American streets.28 The international
respect for Cuba’s health programs may have initially muted the critiques of this policy,
particularly on the part of academics and health professionals. The striking Cuban success in

22

This point was stressed by a health care worker who contracted HIV through sexual contact with his
partner and was informed of his HIV status in 1988. This man said that any refusal to enter the sanitoria
would have led to a conflict with the health authorities, who would have taken him to court. Rosenfield and
Herbrand, “The AIDS colony.” Leiner discusses the psychological factors that made resistance difficult.
Leiner, 122, 125. For a further discussion of this issue see also Healton and Bayrer, “Controlling AIDS in
Cuba,” 1024
23
See the footage of the sanitaria in the following video: John Marshall Law School, “Aspects of
Criminalization: Cuba’s HIV-AIDS Quarantine,” VHS tape. Chicago: John Marshall Law School, 1993.
24
Rosenfield and Herbrand, “The AIDS colony.” For a further description of the sanitaria see Leiner 117121.
25
Leiner, 2. See also ibid., 27. Leiner listed five reasons why Cuba maintained its policy of quarantine.
Ibid, 123.
26
Leiner, 28. The last of the camps was not closed until 1969. For Cuban legislation on homosexuality see
Leiner 35, 43.
27
Ian Lumsden, Machos, Maricones, and Gays: Cuba and Homosexuality. (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1996), 163. R. Bazell, “Happy Campers,” New Republic, 206:10 (1992), 12.
28
See the comments of Rev. Charles Carnahan in the following video: John Marshall Law School,
“Aspects of Criminalizaton: Cuba’s HIV-AIDS Quarantine.”
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controlling the virus, and the high human toll that HIV took in other Caribbean nations such as
Haiti, also served to legitimate the policy.
By the early 1990s, however, the Cuban government’s AIDS program became
problematic. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the Cuban government lost its major
international sponsor and entered into economically difficult times. Although the health sector
was privileged, it too was hurt by the economic crisis: “The dissemination of any research
findings related to HIV/AIDS and other medical, nursing, and/or public health issues is limited,
however, as nearly all medical and nursing journals ceased publication in 1992, due to the
shortage of paper.”29 Tourism became increasing important to providing the government foreign
exchange, and with the tourists came prostitution.30 The Cuban government politically could not
afford to offend visiting tourists by mandating HIV tests.31 This made education increasingly
important to fight the disease. At the same time, the sanatorium program was relatively
expensive ($24,000 U.S. a year) on a per capita basis.32 In 1993, therefore, the Cuban
government began to relax its sanatorium policy, at first allowing people to leave the clinic
without chaperons, and ultimately even allowing some people to return to their communities.33
This policy was especially important as Cuba’s quarantine policy attracted increasing
international attention. Some scholars worried about the possibility that mistaken test results
might lead to the incarceration of HIV- people, despite a careful system of checks that made this
unlikely.34 Political activists, some of whom had long sympathized with the Cuban revolution,
argued against the Cuban policy of quarantine.35 A number of academics and health care
professionals wrote articles that questioned the rationale of the program, although some writers
also defended Cuban policy.36
In October 1992, for example, Timothy Martin, a student at John Marshal Law School,
and Mark Woods, a faculty member at the same university, traveled to Cuba to take part in the
First International Conference on AIDS. They produced a video in which Timothy Martins
strove to appear balanced, even though he clearly had serious reservations about Cuban policy.
In the video interviews with sanitarium residents included statements by several people who
criticized their internment: “I would give up one year of my life to have my liberty again,” said
one speaker. Another person said “We shouldn’t be here. We haven’t broken any laws. We
aren’t criminals. We should be with our families. We should be in our homes.”37 At the same
time, some interviewees defended the sanitarium system. And in his narration, Timothy Martins
noted a division within those interned within the sanitarium. People interned for less than a year
generally resented the loss of their liberty, while those confined for three years or more seemed
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Janice M. Swanson, Ayesha E. Gill, Karen Wald and Karen A. Swanson, “Comprehensive Care and the
Sanatoria: Cuba’s Response to HIV/AIDS,” The Journal of the Association of Nurses in AIDS Care 6:1
(January-February 1995), 40.
30
Keith K. Key and Daniel J. DeNoon, “Cuba Sees AIDS Rise Linked to Tourism Growth,” AIDS Weekly
Plus (Dec. 23, 1996): 12.
31
Pérez-Stable, “Cuba’s Response,” 565.
32
Helena Hansen and N.E. Groce, “From Quarantine to Condoms,” 271.
33
It is true that there were tight restrictions on who could be released from the sanitaria. See Leiner, 120121.
34
Leiner, 129. Healton and Bayrer, “Controlling AIDS in Cuba,” 1023. Thomas C. Quinn, Fernando R.K.
Zacarias, Ronald K. St John, “AIDS in the Americas,” The New England Journal of Medicine 320:15
(April 1989): 1007.
35
Ibid, 143-144.
36
For a defense of the mass internment of HIV+ Cubans, based on cultural relativism, see Santana, Faas,
and Wald, “Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Cuba,” 193.
37
John Marshall Law School, “Aspects of Criminalizaton: Cuba’s HIV-AIDS Quarantine.”
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resigned to their fate.38 But such materials increased the pressure on the Cuban government,
which badly wished to defend its progressive international image.
This image would be especially challenged because of surprising developments within
Cuba. A small sub-culture rock music fans (called roqueros) had entered into frequent conflict
with government authorities and the police over issues such as military service and work.
Beginning in 1989 some of these young people began deliberately to inject themselves with
HIV+ blood as an act of political protest unique to Cuba. In the Cuban city of Pinar del Rio this
strange movement spread and by 1992 perhaps a hundred people had deliberately infected
themselves with AIDS. At first most of these people were young men, but in many cases their
wives and girlfriends also chose to infect themselves in order to be able to join their partners in
the sanitaria. Many of these people at first concealed from the authorities that they had injected
HIV+ blood, for fear of being sent to prison rather than the sanitaria.39 Others did not, however,
and this issue became a serious political embarrassment for the Cuban government when
Vladimir Ceballos produced a documentary Maldito sea tu nombre, libertad in 1994.40
This was not the only documentary on the Cuban roquero movement, but it represented
the initial discovery of this movement by the American media. Both Newsweek and the New York
Times Magazine quickly published articles by reporters who interviewed some of these people.41
Vladimir Ceballos was a rocker from Pinar del Rio who had many friends who had chosen to
commit suicide by this means. He and a friend, Carlos Zequeira, shot a video with some of their
HIV+ friends, who had been released from the sanitarium “over a long weekend when the rockers
had passes to attend a local baseball game. . .”42 When they could not show the film in Cuba,
Ceballos and his friend sought political asylum in the United States.
The film itself was often shot outdoors, and at times the sound quality is poor. It consists
of a series of interviews with the roqueros, in which they describe how they injected themselves
with HIV, and their subsequent thoughts on their decision. With its descriptions of police
brutality and reflections about impending death, the video is emotionally devastating. The
roqueros described the rise of this phenomenon, which they seemed to understand would confuse
any-one from outside their world: “Look Vladi, the problem we had with this AIDS thing was
more than anything the rise of a fever that we had among us in the years of ’90 and ’91. But all
that is due to the repression that existed against us. . .”43 It was particularly convincing because
the sanitarium patients gave names, and described their life histories in detail:
I went to Santa Clara for the first festival of rock. When we were coming back,
we went by Los Cocos Sanitarium. And there myself and Ramon Pereza, who’s
now dead, el “Bruja,” as we called him, injected ourselves with Juan Miguel
Garcia’s blood, the son of the director of education, who’s now also dead.
Orlirio was also with us. That’s how it all went. Until today there still continue
to appear new people who injected themselves. Almost all the patient population
38

Such divisions among the sanatorium residents have been found by others. See Santana, Faas, and Wald,
Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Cuba,” 188.
39
For the fact that Cuban’s concealed how they acquired the infection see Scott Malcomson, “Socialism or
Death?” New York Times Magazine, September 25, 1994, 48. See also Vladimir Ceballos, Maldita sea tu
nombre libertad, VHS documentary, 1994.
40
I wish to thank Vladimir Ceballos for providing me a copy of his film.
41
Paul Katel, “Cuba: did some youths get AIDS on purpose?” Newsweek, 123:20 (May 16, 1994): 42.
Scott Malcomson, “Socialism or Death?” New York Times Magazine, September 25, 1994, 45-49. See also
Frank Baker, “Filmmaker tells stories of Cubans who injected themselves with HIV,” Associated Press,
January 17, 1995. Accessed on-line on September 9, 2002 at http://www.geocities.com/lavola01/
English1.html.
42
For a discussion of the film’s origins see Malcomson, 48.
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Maldita sea tu nombre libertad. Translation by Luis Rivera.
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here infected themselves with a syringe through direct contact. Since we injected
ourselves the sale of syringes in pharmacies has been been prohibited. And then
Vladi, like me many get HIV. Now almost all of them are dead.”44
Other rockers described the emotional impact upon them that having tens of their friends infected
and dying had taken.
Some of the women described how they had decided to infect themselves so that they
could be with their partners. Raysa Valdes described her partners’ response to her decision:
“Then I chose to get HIV. He is already dead. He never wanted to involve me but I wanted to do
it. I went to where he was so that he would inject me in October 1991.”45 Most of these women,
including Raysa Valdes who had a nine-year old son, regretted their actions. Raysa Valdes
herself died at the age of 24. The video ended with the names of some of those who died,
together with their age at death, which was usually in the early twenties.
At first the government itself did not appear to be greatly concerned about the epidemic,
as one Cuban doctor working in the sanitariums made clear to Scott Malcomson, who described
the conversation in the New York Times Magazine: “According to one doctor in Havana’s
flagship AIDS sanitarium, the dead and dying rockers are no great loss because they wouldn’t
have contributed much to society anyway.”46 The government did not see this movement as a
serious political challenge, and never denied that people had acquired AIDS by self-injection.
But the issue did not go away. During this same time period the Swedish film maker Bengt
Norborg released a documentary, Socialismo o muerte, which also contained interviews with
young Cubans who had decided to commit suicide by HIV. Like the young roqueros of Ceballos’
documentary, these youth also complained about the police oppression that they argued made this
step logical: “In any other country this would by a problem of madness; in Cuba it’s a political
problem.”47 The Cuban AIDS specialist Dr. Jorge Pérez, interviewed by Norborg, argued that the
problem was the suicidal attitude of the young roqueros, rather than a larger political issue.
Similar statements by senior officials in the AIDS program did not prevent continued negative
publicity. In 1996 Leon Ichasa released Bitter Sugar (Spanish with English subtitles) which dealt
with this subject in a fictionalized manner. By the mid-1990’s the phenomenon of self-injection
with HIV in Cuba had stopped.48 But the issue of the roqueros would not go away.
The public discussion of the roquero phenomenon made Cuba’s quarantine policy
problematic. Still, this was likely less important as a factor leading to the change of the policy
than the growing power of the gay movement internationally during the 1990s. The Cuban
epidemic was unique in Latin America in that, unlike the trend elsewhere in Latin America, it
became increasingly focused in the homosexual community with time. While many other nations
in the hemisphere had historically had equally homophobic policies as Cuba, this political trend
made the policy of quarantine politically costly. When combined by the growing importance of
tourism as a means for the spread of HIV, the Cuban government needed to rethink its policies.49
By the late 1990s the Cuban government was placing much greater emphasis on
preventing AIDS through education. While the government had never ignored education, it is
perhaps fair to say that it was a less important facet of the government’s program than the
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sanatoria. In 1996 Doctors without Borders traveled to Cuba and advised the Ministry of Health
on AIDS education programs and supplied education materials. In 1998 Cuba founded the
National Center for the prevention of STDs and HIV. This organization had a phone line, ran
workshops for youth, and organized a trailer covered with flowers that drove through the
countryside giving out AIDS information.50 The sanatoria residents themselves began to play a
larger role in AIDS education:
One result of the new environment created of the sanitaria created by Dr. Pérez is
the Grupo de Prevencion del SIDA (GPSIDA), an informal, officially authorized
group of HIV-positive people, health professionals, and social scientists that was
formed at the initiative of HIV-positive sanitarium residents. GPSIDA has the
mission of supporting HIV-positive people in their daily lives and of educating
the community at large about the experience of HIV-positive people as well as
about modes of transmission and prevention of HIV infection.51
It is true that GPSIDA exists in only three provinces.52 The lack of similar NGO’s in Cuba also
remains a serious impediment to the government’s efforts to contain the virus through education.
But the renewed emphasis on education, and the role that HIV+ people could play in this effort,
was a significant alteration in Cuba’s AIDS policy.
It is also true that one could overestimate the extent of the change to the sanatorium
system. The majority of HIV+ people have decided to remain in the sanatoria. This may be
because of the psychological screening that is required to leave the sanatoria, or because of the
economic hardships they faced outside.53 Nor has the Cuban government done adequate work to
replace the sanatorium system with one based on education and safe sex. Helena Hansen found
that “condoms are often unavailable due to chronic shortages of imported goods. . .”54 In
practice, the government and the media also continue to portray AIDS as a U.S. disease, which
may decrease Cuban’s desire to practice safe-sex when their partners are Cuban.55 Still, there are
significant changes taking place in the Cuban AIDS program. Given the excellent education
system, strong public health-infrastructure, and government pride in Cuba’s public health system,
Cuba will continue to have the basis for an effective response to this epidemic.
In summation, from its inception the Cuban policy to control AIDS has been shaped by
international factors. The first reported cases were among soldiers returning from Africa.
Because of Cuba’s pride in its international reputation in the field of public health, its equation of
the disease with foreign corruption, and its distrust of NGOs because of their possible links to
foreign countries, the government adopted a sanatorium system to control AIDS. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the dollarization of the Cuban economy, the rising importance of
tourism, and the growth of the sex trade, this policy became problematic. At the same time,
international publicity around the roquero movement and the growing power of the gay
movement in North America and Europe made the policy costly. Cuba needed its international
allies in the progressive movement. Still, the program has been altered but not abandoned. Cuba
takes great pride that it has avoided the significant HIV+ rates that some other Caribbean
countries, such as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, have suffered. As a result, Cuba’s AIDS
program is currently a hybrid that has embraced mass education without totally abandoning mass
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testing. Despite its successes, however, it is not likely that Cuba’s program will serve as a model
for other nations, as is now the case with Brazil.56
Brazil
The Brazilian media did not report on the first cases of AIDS in Brazil until 1983,
although the first case had appeared in 1980.57 Initially, the disease was overwhelmingly one of
gay, relatively well-to-do men, living in major cities, and in particular in São Paulo. The military
still controlled the national government until 1985, so throughout the latter half of the 1980s the
nations’ attention and energy was given to the question of democratization. The government did
create a structure to respond to the appearance of HIV, and it launched an AIDS control program
in 1985. Still, funding was minimal, and in many respects the private response to the epidemic in
the early years was more significant. The first non-governmental organization, Grupo de Apoio à
Prevenção à AIDS (GAPA), also was founded in 1985. ABIA, the Associação Brasileira
Interdsciplinar de AIDS, was founded the following year.58 These would become the two best
known of the perhaps 600 nongovernmental organizations that, according to Paulo Teixiera, now
run perhaps 1000 programs to fight AIDS.59
This grassroots effort was vital to overcome government response to the epidemic that
initially was far weaker than Cuba’s, as well as the powerful stigma that surrounded AIDS. The
government at first failed to make AIDS a national priority:
The association of AIDS with privilege at the beginning of the epidemic had two
repercussions. On one hand, it was used as an excuse for the government’s lack
of attention to the disease, as the government could claim that AIDS affected a
very small minority (the “First World Within”), who could afford their own
health care abroad and that it should use its resources for the massive endemic
diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis, that were affecting the deprived in
massive numbers. In a page-length article that appeared in the daily O Globo on
September 8, 1985, Health Minister Carlos Santana declared that even though his
office was taking a series of measures against AIDS, this disease could not really
be considered a priority.60

Herbert Daniel and other AIDS activists argued that the government perceived AIDS as “an
epidemic of `minorities,’ almost a problem of a few rich and well-provided for homosexuals.”61
For this reason, the government effort appeared to lack energy. By many measures, the Brazilian
government’s response was far weaker than Cuba’s. For example, the Brazilian government
failed to take active measures to protect the blood supply, which caused a catastrophe for
Brazilian hemophiliacs.62
Brazilian gay organizations had historically been weak, in part because Brazilians
perceived sexual identity differently than their North American counterparts. As the epidemic
took a heavy toll in young men who had sex with men in major cities this began to change.
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While the statements of AIDS activists such as Daniels (who died of the disease in 1992) about
the extent of the government’s indifference might be exaggerated, they accurately reflect how his
community perceived the government’s attitude in the early 1990s:
To this day the government has taken no action on the epidemic, continuing the
five-year record of inaction and indifference of the previous administration.
There is today absolutely no national program for controlling the epidemic. The
service set up by the previous administration in the Ministry of Health in 1986,
when there were already more than 1000 reported cases of AIDS, was a symbolic
gesture. And so it remains. The idea that AIDS is inevitable, almost a kind of
price to be paid for the modernity of our cities, the idea that it is not quite a
Brazilian disease but something foreign or strange, has remained almost
unchanged from the view that prevailed at that nearly forgotten time when AIDS
arrived in Brazil.63
The emerging gay organizations and NGOs devoted to AIDS were emboldened by the climate of
political activism that dominated as the country returned to democracy. These groups rallied to
ensure a more powerful government response to the epidemic, and dignity for HIV+ people.
Examples of the discrimination that HIV+ people faced were not hard to find. As Herbert
Daniel, the Brazilian AIDS activist, has argued, early articles on AIDS in the Brazilian media
showed a lack of concern for people with AIDS, or even celebrated the arrival of the disease as a
punishment for sinners.64 Flávio Braune Wiik has described the story of a Xokleng couple in the
state of Santa Catarina who tested positive for HIV in 1988. When the media learned that the
first Native American in Brazil had tested positive for HIV, it created a media circus. Dozens of
journalists rushed to the couple’s village, as did government representatives and doctors.65 The
Xokléng people faced public ridicule, the woman died, the man faced death threats, his family fell
apart, and his parents separated.66 Clearly, a great deal of work in AIDS education and
community building needed to be done.
Given this history in the 1980s and early 1990s, what is stunning is the speed with which
the Brazilian government changed course and began to devote both energy and attention to the
epidemic. Two domestic factors help explain this transformation. One is the transformation of
the disease from one that largely affected gay males in urban centers, to a disease that also
heavily impacted women, and had spread to the most remote areas of the country. The second
was the astounding political organization of various communities that rallied together to fight
AIDS. In 1989, Brazilian NGOs devoted to fighting AIDS held their first national conference in
Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais.67 In the five years that followed, a broad array of organizations
appeared representing, women, afro-Brazilians, urban youth, gays, transsexuals, prostitutes and
others.68
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In the early 1990s the Brazilian government responded to these pressures by slowly
increasing the services available to HIV+. Beginning in 1991 the government began to distribute
AZT through the public health system. This represented a major advance, given that in the past
health authorities would “say in the press that AZT should not be purchased for patients in public
hospitals because `they’re going to die anyway.’”69 In 1993 Brazil began to produce AZT in its
own laboratories.70 But it was in 1996 that something truly remarkable happened. In the summer
of 1996 scientists announced that HART (highly active retroviral therapy) had proven to be
extremely successful in limiting the replication of HIV. Patients on the so-called “drug cocktail”
could have the level of the virus in their blood fall to levels that were not detectable. On
November 13, 1996 Law number 9313 came into force, and gave HIV+ people the right to free
medications through the public health system.
It is difficult to overstate the extent of the Brazilian achievement in creating the necessary
structure to test for HIV viral load, CD4 cell counts, and HIV resistance. A network of
dispensaries had to be administered and maintained. Doctors had to supervise patients and ensure
their compliance with their regimen, if the virus was not to mutate and develop resistance to the
disease. Most of all, the government had to obtain the necessary medications, many of which
were extremely expensive. This was a seemingly impossible task for a developing country which
already had a significant HIV+ population. Yet Brazil achieved it. Moreover, the program
proved to be cost effective because patients with HIV were not entering public hospitals for
treatment for opportunistic infections. People now had an incentive to be tested for HIV, because
they knew that they would receive care. This increased the number of people who knew their
HIV status, and gave the medical system opportunities to educate those who were HIV+. Patients
receiving medical treatment proved to be as compliant as their U.S. counterparts, which
minimized the spread of viral resistance. Lastly, people on regular treatment are less contagious,
which also helped to contain the virus. Together with the aggressive education efforts of both the
Brazilian government and NGOs, Brazil has proven to be enormously successful in controlling
the spread of HIV.71
The Brazilian government has also been able to maintain the program through changes in
administration and political challenges. According to Pedro Chequer, president of Brazil’s
national AIDS commission, a variety of Brazilian actors have proved capable of rallying around
this program: “Cooperation agreements with the political opposition have ensured the approval of
laws and budgets and have provided continuity to the program despite changes in
governments.”72 At the same time, the Brazilian government has been able to reach an
understanding with the Catholic Church, an achievement that has eluded many other Latin
American governments:
In the beginning the Church wanted to control information, but this met with
strong resistance from the Ministry of Health and the AIDS Program.
Abstinence, fidelity and marriage were just not for everyone; condoms were the
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most sensible option for many. Since 1997, we have been dealing with the
chairman of the Bishops Conference and the Church is now our great ally.73
These political successes reflect the powerful domestic forces that have shaped the Brazilian
governments’ response to the epidemic.
The Brazilian government’s successful program, however, also occurred both in spite of,
and because of, international pressures. In this sense, the story is almost a cautionary tale about
the two faces of globalization. Brazilian policy led it to enter a debate that drew in international
pharmaceutical companies, the United States, the World Trade Organization, and international
NGOs. In order to be able to provide medications to HIV+ people, Brazil decided to produce
generic versions of medications that were not covered by that nation’s patent law. This angered
pharmaceutical companies, which pressured the U.S. government both to file a complaint with the
WTO, and to invoke “the `Special 301’ provision of the country’s Trade Act, which allows the
United States to impose tariffs unilaterally on a country’s exports to the United States if adequate
IP standards are not met.”74
As a result of this stand-off, a lengthy battle ensued between the United States and the
pharmaceutical companies, on the one hand, and Brazil and the NGOs, on the other. For Brazil
this was a critical issue. The threat that it might break companies’ patents proved to be a
powerful incentive for corporations to drop the price of their medications.75 Without reducing
these costs, the Brazilian government did not have sufficient resources to maintain its program.
With the support of international NGOS, Brazil brought intense political pressure to bear upon
the U.S. government. In the summer of 2001 the United States government “retracted a complaint
filed with the World Trade Organization over a law that enabled Brazil to produce cheap generic
versions of antiretroviral drugs manufactured by multinational drugs.”76 Equally important, at the
Doha conference in Qatar Brazil saw the wording it desired on compulsory licensing adopted by
the WTO.77
This did not end the contest. Pharmaceutical companies remained concerned, particularly
after Brazil announced in July 2002 that it would “share its generic AIDS drugs and the
technology used to produce them with some of the world’s poorest countries.”78 But Brazil
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continued to enjoy international support. For example, this bilateral problem became a multilateral issue in October 2002 when Latin American nations refused to accept any provisions of
the Free Trade of the Americas proposal that might limit countries’ abilities to produce generic
AIDS drugs.79 This support, and the consistent efforts of NGOS, has allowed Brazil to continue
to follow this policy without paying a significant economic penalty.80
It may seem that the story of AIDS in Brazil illustrates the limitations of the Washington
consensus and the risks to contemporary globalization. At the same time, however, Brazil’s
AIDS program has received significant funding from the World Bank.81 By the early 1990s, the
World Bank had begun to make AIDS a major priority, and began to redefine this issue as a
developmental question.82 In 1994 the World Bank provided $160 million for Brazil to control
AIDS and other STDs. While Brazil had already decided to distribute free medications to AIDS
patients, this loan was important in making this program financially possible. A second loan for
$165 million was made in 1998 and helped Brazil to continue its innovative program. This is
despite the fact that the World Bank does not support all aspects of the Brazilian program, in
particular the free provision of medication to people with AIDS. The World Bank had believed
this care to be too expensive, and that the funds would have been better expended on prevention
services. Ironically, the World Bank has continued to be unhappy with Brazilian policies, despite
their apparent success, even while its funding has helped to make them possible.83 In addition,
Brazil has also obtained significant resources from the U.S. government (such as the U.S. Agency
for International Development, or USAID) and NGOs, such as the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation as well as the Ford Foundation. Both the Brazilian government’s
response to the epidemic, and the work of a multitude of NGOs, has been funded by the
international community.
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has not stopped in Brazil, but as the work of Celia Landmann
Szwarcwald and other Brazilian epidemiologists have showed, it is decelerating. This is not to
deny the challenge that Brazil faces. The ratio of men to women has continued to decline, while
the poor are increasingly affected. The disease is making progress into the most remote areas of
Brazil, including the Amazon.84 Brazil still has a very high rate of notified AIDS cases.85
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Despite its immense efforts, Brazil has not been able to control the epidemic in the same manner
that Cuba has. Nonetheless, the Brazilian achievements are impressive: “Over the last 5 years,
has achieved much in the fight against HIV/AIDS, including halving the mortality rate, cutting
the HIV/AIDS hospitalization rate by 80%, and sharply reducing mother-to-child transmission.”86
This has generated national pride in the program, which Brazil hopes to use as a model for other
developing countries.
Brazil is now positioning itself as an international model for how developing countries
can effectively fight AIDS. In August 2002 it announced that it signed an agreement with other
Lusophone countries to share its technology to produce generic medications. This followed an
announcement at the International AIDS conference in Barcelona that summer, where Brazil had
pledged a small amount of money ($100,000 each) for ten pilot projects to promote the Brazilian
model in other countries.87 NGOs had been pressing Brazil to sell generic anti-HIV medications
to other Latin American nations.88 Given the scale of the funding, these projects might have a
limited impact. They may have been equally significant as a measure of Brazilians’ pride in their
national AIDS program, and their wish to draw international attention to their success.
Conclusion
Cuba and Brazil have adopted radically different policies to controlling the HIV epidemic
in their countries. While Cuba initially adopted a policy of mass testing and quarantine, Brazil
came to rely on mass education, and the free provision of medications to the HIV+. Both national
programs reflected Brazil and Cuba’s particular national experiences and political systems. But
international factors also shaped the creation and maintenance of both programs. One of most
puzzling aspects of the HIV epidemic in the Americas is the wide variety in the dominant mode
of HIV transmission. Some public health experts have referred to a “mosaic of infections” in
Latin America. It is arguable that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is more heterogeneous in the
Americas than anywhere else on the globe at this time. This diversity is surprising given the
linguistic unity, shared history, common culture, and religious commonalities that shape this
region’s identity. While many factors help to explain the epidemic’s complexity, one variable
may be countries’ international relationships. This context may help us to understand questions
such as why in Puerto Rico HIV is often spread through IV drug use, while in Colombia it is not,
and the international constraints that influence the public health response to the disease in nations
as varied as Cuba and Brazil.
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